

## REPORT

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1. "Five members of the Warsaw regime have direct telephone communication with Moscow. They are: Jacob Berman, Boleslaw Bierut, Stanislaw Radkiewicz, Stefan Wierblowski and Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. Apart from these five men, no one knows with whom they are communicating and from whom specifically are they receiving their instructions. It is obvious for people who contact him that Berman is the top liaison between Moscow and Warsaw.
2. "If high government dignitaries ask Berman for instructions, he either gives his orders immediately, or tells the dignitaries to call again in thirty minutes. It is not always possible to obtain connection with Moscow within thirty minutes, and it should be, therefore, assumed that a high Soviet authority resides in the Polish capital. The place of residence of that authority is most probably located in the Ministry of Public Security, at 6 Koszykowa Street. As regards the identity of that authority, two names are mentioned; General Malinov and Henryk Amsterdamski. But these rumors have never been confirmed and it can be assumed that 'Malinov' and 'Amsterdamski' are code names concealing high Soviet officials, who may change from time to time. It is certain that the Soviet Embassy is not the main source of ruling power in Poland. It is also certain that Berman gives his decisions precisely at the promised time.
3. "Soviet Ambassador Lebediev is the dean of the diplomatic corps. But the real chief of the Embassy was at first Pieutin (now in the United Nations?) and after him Counselor Jakowlev. But Moscow's decisions relating to the policy of the Warsaw government do not pass through the Embassy channels. Other Soviet offices, located mostly in the suburb of Praga, have a technical character (transport, control of railroads and stations) and cannot serve as an intermediary for political decisions.
4. "It would be wrong to reduce the entire problem of ruling Poland to one person or one institution. Such assumption would be contrary to the practices established in Russia and in the bolshevik party. The machinery of the Soviet Union is adjusted to the principle of a 'two-channel' decision. There are no exceptions from this principle. The government is doubled by the party; each technical department head is doubled by a political deputy. There are no important matters the decisions on which would be taken by one man. Such is the structure of the Soviet Union, and such procedure has been adopted as regards the sovietization of Poland. Government policies are decided by the party

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politburo and must be implemented by all Ministers concerned. The Central Committee of the PZPR takes its decisions collectively, by a majority vote, but the personal influence of some members is often decisive.

5. "The Soviets entrusted the Central Committee of the PZPR with working out plans, projects and time-tables of the sovietization of Poland. These plans are submitted for Moscow's approval. It can be said, therefore, that the Central Committee has the right, and even the duty, of initiative. More so, the political career of various Central Committee members depends on their ability to work out and propose such plans which would further the sovietization of Poland with the least material and political expense. Blind obedience and the executing of instructions is not enough to promote a political career, but must be supplemented by enterprise and initiative. Such enterprising men are Bierut, Berman, Radkiewicz, and now also Wladyslaw Wolski, the Minister of Public Administration. Minc is no longer ranked with the most trusted Poles. In the most important matter, of course, no one can assume the responsibility without consulting Moscow.
6. "But once Moscow has announced its decision, it is up to Bierut, Berman and others to implement the decision in any manner they deem proper (e.g. the conduct of elections, the continuation of the talks with the Catholic Bishops, the pressure against the Church etc.). In implementing the decisions of Moscow the 'two-channel' principle is adhered to most strictly. Bierut, for instance, must co-ordinate his views with Berman and vice versa. In home affairs the deciding factors are Alexander Zawadzki and Roman Zambrowski, in military and security matters Radkiewicz and Rokossovsky, in foreign affairs Wierblowski and Modzelewski (the latter is ill).
7. "The heads of all departments of the Warsaw government are doubled by political deputies. In case of a conflict between the Minister and his deputy, Berman performs the functions of an arbiter. The following are the names of the Ministers and their political deputies in some departments,

Ministry of Public Security - Radkiewicz is doubled by Mietkowski, but Gen. Konrad Swietlik may replace Mietkowski.

Ministry of Education - Skrzyszewski's political deputy is Trojanowski, and not the Socialist Henryk Jablonski who acts as Vice-Minister.

Economic Departments - Hilary Minc is doubled by Eugeniusz Szyr. But attention should be paid to Eugeniusz Ziolkowski, Minc's cabinet chief, who is a trusted man of the Ministry of Public Security, and to Henryk Rozanski, in charge of the economic treaties division, who is an expert on trade relations with Russia and highly regarded by Moscow.

Prime Minister - Needless to say, Berman is the Prime Minister of Poland and not 'the clown Cyrankiewicz'.

General Staff - Wladyslaw Korczyz is doubled by Gen. Wacław Komar, chief of Army Intelligence. The setup in the Ministry of National Defense is somewhat different with three Vice-Ministerial positions, now occupied by Edward Ochab, Stanislaw Poplawski and Wladyslaw Korczyz. It is not clear whether the Vice-Minister for supply, Gen. Mieczyslaw Jaroszewicz, a Pole, is still in office after Korczyz's appointment.

8. "The co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw is limited to formal and technical matters. Important matters are handled on a higher level. The director of the Eastern Department and the chief of the Soviet division in the Foreign Office do not know personally M. Lebediev, who talks only to Berman, Modzelewski, and now Wierblowski.
9. "The Warsaw Ambassador in Moscow, Naszkowski, is allowed to communicate only with Aleksandrov, director of the IV department (satellites) of the Soviet

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Foreign Office, apart, of course, from formal visits. The Warsaw Ministry of Foreign Affairs has only a representative-technical character. The Soviets are not interested in the political departments of the Ministry which have no power of decision. However, the Soviets infiltrate with their trusted men the technical divisions of the Ministry, e.g., diplomatic couriers (all trusted men of the Soviets), cipher office (all Soviets), and the radio-operators of the short-wave transmitter in Wilanow. This transmitter calls, according to a pre-arranged time-table, all foreign outposts, sending them new codes and ciphers. All political outposts have their own receiving stations, and the more important ones operate transmitters.

10. "The Soviets do not need to resort to drastic methods as regards their relations with the Warsaw government, because the aims of both governments are identical. Lebediev is always kind and polite. The Soviets demand that the Warsaw Foreign Office employees look presentable and behave correctly. Lebediev often rebukes Polish diplomats for untidiness or bad behavior."

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